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Abstract
We specifv and estimate an equilibrium job search model with pro-”
ductivitv differences across labor  market segments. The model allows for
two types of unemployment: frictional unemployment due to search fric-
tions and structural unemployment due to wage floors. Wage floors exist
because of high unemplovment benefits or binding minimum wages. The.
productivitv  distribution is estimated semi-nonparametrically along the
lines of Gailant-Nvchka,  using Hermite  series approximation. We decom-
pose the total unemployment rate and we examine the effect of changes in
the minimum wage.
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1 Introduction
Most studies on the impact of minimum wages on employment and wages exploit
the fact that minimum wages vary over time or across labor  market segments.’
As an alternative, Meyer and Wise (1983a,b)  propose a method in which the
employment effect of minimum wages can be inferred using data on the cross-
sectional distribution of wages only, and without any variation in minimum wages
at all. This method rests upon two assumptions. First, in the absence of a manda-
torv  minimum wage, the wage earnings distribution of individual workers follows
has a functional form that is recoverable (see Flinn and Heckman  (1982)). This
means that the distribution belongs to a family of distributions that is not closed
under truncation. Thus the untruncated distribution can be fully identified its
truncated version (for example, the lognormal distribution belongs to this family
of distributions). Second, above a certain level (close to the minimum wage) the
wage earnings distribution is unaffected by the imposition of a minimum wage.
With these two assumptions it is possible to deduce the number of workers who
should be earning a wage at or below the minimum from the estimated truncated
wage earnings distribution.
The Mever and Wise technique has been used by e.g. AlbEk  and Madsen
(1987) and ‘Van Soest (1989). Obviously, the fundamental drawback is that the
estimated effect of the minimum wage is sensitive to functional form assumptions
on the distribution of wage earnings. In particular, the probability mass below
the minimum wage is obtained by extrapolation of a distribution to a region
where there are no observations, and alternative assumptions on the distribution
of wages can result in different estimates of the effect of (changes in) minimum
wages. 2 In contrast to this, Koning, , Ridder and Van den Berg (1995) present a
model in which the effect of minimum wages can be identified without making
untestable distributional assumptions. They specify and estimate an equilibrium
search model which allows for two types of unemployment: unemployment due to
search frictions (frictional unemployment) and unemployment due to minimum
wages (structural unemployment). This is an interesting distinction, as it allows
one to infer the group of individuals that also would be unemployed in the ab-
sence of minimum wages. Due to the structural setup of the model, it is possible
to identifv the rate of structural unemplovment with data on (censored) unem-ri ”
plovment durations and/or the fraction of unemployment. In addition? the rate of
structural unemployment is also equal to the probability mass of the individual
‘See Card and Krueger (1995) and Dolado et al. (1996) for recent surveys of the literature.
‘See Dickens Machin  and Manning (1994) for an evaluation of the Meyer and Wise approach.f
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productivity distribution below the minimum wage. This can be used as a check
on the specification of the productivitv  distribution.b
In this paper we relax the distributional assumptions made by Koning, Rid-
der and Van den Berg (1995) with respect to the productivity distribution of
individual workers. For this we follow the so called ‘semi-nonparametric’ (SNP)
estimation method developed by Gallant and Nvchka (1987). The basic idea of
this estimation method is that any proper density can be approximated by a
Hermite  series. Within the context of the model, the advantages of the SNP
approach are twofold. First, it allows us to estimate the truncated productivity
density more accurately, resulting in better estimates of e.g. the elasticity of the
rate of structural unemployment with respect to the minimum wage. Second, it
reduces the impact of misspecification of the productivity distribution on the
implied rate of structural unemployment. This rate is overidentified, and a more
flexible functional form may help us reducing the biasing impact of this on the
parameter estimates of the model.
The organization of this paper will be as follows. Section 2 discusses the
Burdett-Mortensen model and the extension to heterogeneous agents. Section 3
describes the data we use in the empirical analysis, and the likelihood function is
derived in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the identification of the model, as well as
the SNP estimation method. In Section 6 we conduct two simulation experiments
in order to test for the accuracv  of the SNP method, as well as to examine thed
impact of misspecification on the parameter estimates of the model. In Section
7 we present the estimation results of the equilibrium search model. Section 8
concludes. Most of the exposition in Sections 2, 3 and 4 will be kept brief, as the
same material is discussed more extensively in Koning, Ridder and Van den Berg
(1995).
2 The equilibrium search model
2.1 Equilibrium search with identical agents
Consider a labor  market with identical agents, i.e. a market in which all workers
are equally productive at all firms. Even in this case, the Burdett-Mortensen
model has a dispersed equilibrium wage (offer) distribution, i.e. the law of one
price does not hold. Allowing for heterogeneitv in the productivity of workers adds”
t,o  the equilibrium dispersion of wages, and it allows us to distinguish between
frictional and structural unemplovment.
We assume t,hat there are large fixed numbers of workers and firms participat-
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ing in the labor  market (formally a continuum of each). The measure of workers is
denoted by m.,  whereas the measure of firms is normalized to one. Workers receive
job offers at given Poisson rates, X,  when employed, with
0 < A,,  Al <- 00.  Job offers are independent random drawings from the distribu-
tion F(w)  of wage offers. When an offer arrives, the worker must decide whether
to accept the offer or to reject it and continue searching for a. better one. Workers
become unemployed at the exogenous separation rate S (0 < 6 < oo).  During
unemployment, the worker receives unemplovment benefits b  (0 < b < oo). A-
firm posts a wage that is the same for all workers, and it does not bargain over
this wage. In the basic model, the marginal value product of any worker at any
firm is the same. It is denoted by p. The firms have a linear production function,
so that the average and marginal product are equal. Individuals and firms are
assumed to maximize their expected wealth.
Assuming that the wage offer distribution is known and stationary over time
and that wages are constant in jobs, the supply-side of this model is equivalent to
the standard job search model with search on the job (see e.g. Mortensen (1986).
Thus, the optimal strategy of an unemployed worker has the reservation wage
property. The reservation wage T is
r = b + (A, - w4xl) r 6 + A,F(w)dw
. with F = 1 - F.  Employed workers accept any wage offer that exceeds their
current wage.
It is important to distinguish between the distribution of wages offered to
individuals, which is the wage offer distribution F, and the distribution of wages
received bv workers who are currently employed. The latter is referred to as thed
earnings distribution, and we denote this distribution by G. In equilibrium, the
flow of workers out of jobs with a given wage is equal to the inflow in such
jobs. Similarly, the flows into and out’  of unemployment1  are equal. Firms that
offer a wage lower than the reservation wage of the unemploved do not attract”
any worker and t,herefore cannot survive. The market is only viable if there is a
positive gain from trade, i.e. if p > b. Under these assumptions we have
G(w) = SF(u,)
b  + X,F(w)
w>r- (2)
F(r) = 0 0
In (4),  u is the measure of unemployed workers. Thus, u/m is the rate of
frictional unemployment in this market. It is determined by the rates 6 and A,.
Note that with full information on the location of jobs, i.e. in the absence of search
frictions, X, = 00  and u = 0. Frictional unemployment should be distinguished
from structural unemployment, which occurs if the unemployment benefits, or
more generally the value of leisure, exceeds the value product p.  This type of
structural unemployment is voluntary, because workers are better off if they are
unemployed.
If there is a mandatory minimum wage, denoted by wL, then wage offers
must exceed this Iwage. If p < wL, then firms do not employ any worker, and
there is structural unemployment. This type of unemployment is involuntary if
b < p < wL,  because workers would supply labor  if the minimum wage would
be lower than p.  Hence, if p > max(wL, b)  then there is frictional unemployment
equal to u, while if the reverse holds there is voluntary or involuntary structural
unemplovment equal to m.
For the moment, assume that p > max(wL:  b).  The steady-state level of pro-
duction is determined by the size of the steadv-state work force 1 of the firm.. ,
That work force depends on the wage w set by the firm, the reservation wage r
of the unemployed, and the distribution F of wages set by other firms competing
for the same workers. Each firm chooses w to maximize its steady-state profit
flow X,  which, given T and F,  equals (p -  w)l(w;  r, F).
A noncooperative steadv-state equilibrium solution consists of a reservation
wage T and a wage offer distribution F  such that (i) T satisfies (1) given F. ,
;ind (ii) everv  w  in the support of F maximizes the steady-state profit flow 7~c
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) prove t,hat there is a unique equilibrium and they
give closed-form solutions. The distributions F and G have probabilitv density”
functions f and y. with a support equal to [u,  a], with
mas(wL,  r>6[ 1
2
u>: +
6+X, -
The equilibrium wage offer
[I- [&12]JJ
c.d.f and p.d.f.  are
1 1
( >5
Substitution of (6) in (1) gives
r = (S  + X,)2b  + (X, - Xl)XlP
(6 + u2  + (x,  -  Wl
if r > wL.- (8)
If r ‘<  wL,  the equilibrium reservation wage is not given by (8). However in
that case the reservation wage is not effective, because the lowest wage offer is
7~~.  If r > wL then r and w are weighted averages of b  and p. Otherwise w is a-
weighted average of p and wt. Note that r is smaller than b iff A0 is smaller than
Xi.  In that case the unemploved accept wages below b,  because it is easier to findd
a higher paying job if employed. Allowing for this possibility is important given
the empirical evidence on the relative size of b  and r (see e.g. Narendranathan
and Nickel1 (1985) and Van den Berg (1990)).
Using (2))  the equilibrium wage (or earnings) density is
dw>
&/F%  1-
2x
[U? a] l
-
1 (P
9u)“/2  On
Note that both f and g are increasing densities. The wage distribution is
related to the income distribution, and there is abundant empirical evidence that
the income distribution does not have an increasing density. We return to this
issue below. For an employed individual earning a wage w, the exit rate out of
that job equals S + AiF( This rate decreases in w, which is consistent with a
number of empirical studies on job durations (Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1991)
and Van den Berg (1992)).
2.2 Heterogeneity in value products
In reality workers and firms are obviously not identical. d4ll parameters of the
model. ire. X,,  X,  , 6, b  and p vary over workers and/or firms. ,4s  argued in Van den
Berg and Ridder (1998):  t.here  are basically  two ways to introduce heterogene-
itv: within the market and between markets. Heterogeneity within the market”
means that there is one labor  market within which heterogeneous workers and
firms interact. Heterogeneitv between markets means that the labor  market is
segmented and consists of a large number of separate submarkets within which
workers and firms are homogeneous. We follow the latter approach, and we as-
sume that we observe a mixture of homogeneous markets. Conceivably we can
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stratify on all the parameters. In the present context, dispersion in p is par-
ticularly relevant, since it allows for the possibility of structural unemployment
(namely when p < max(wL, b)).  Because we assume that p follows a continuous
distribution, we have effectively a continuum of submarkets which differ in the
value product of workers.
As noted above, there is abundant empirical evidence that the income dis-
tribution does not have an increasing density as is predicted bv the model with
identical agents. Allowing for heterogeneity in p may improve the fit to the ob-
served wage offer and earnings distribution. To see this we consider the following
transformation of w (note that we acknowledge the dependence of the support of
w on P)
P - W-
Y -
P - ul(P)
so that the excess wage w - -~1)  (p) satisfies
uYiLL(P)  = (I-Y)(P-ICC(P)) q2  < y < 1.-c -
(10)
(11)
with 73  =  6/(S  + X,)
Equation (11) describes the wage determination in the Burdett-Mortensen
model. The excess wage w- a(p) is a fraction of the excess productivity p - u(p).
This fraction is a random variable with a distribution that depends on X,/6,
which is the expected number of wage offers during a spell of employment (i.e.
a spell that starts with the acceptance of a job from unemployment and ends
with  a lavoff). This ratio is a measure of the speed at which the worker climbs
the job (and  wage) ladder, with y = 1 corresponding to the bottom, w = u&),
and y = q2  to the top, w = c(p)?  of this ladder. From (11) it follows that the
moments of w - u(p) in either the wage offer or the earnings distribution are the
product of (p - -~(p))~  and a11 expression that onlv  depends on 7. Bv choosingd ”
an appropriate distribution of the productivitv p, the moments of the observed
wage offer or earnings distribution can be matched. Hence, we expect that an
acceptable fit to the data depends on the allowance for sufficient heterogeneity
in p. This is confirmed in Van den Berg and Ridder (1993).
3 The  d a t a
The model is estimated with the 0%  (Netherlands Organization for Strate-
(Gc  Labor Market Research) Labor Supple  Panel Survev.  This panel st,arted  inh %J c
1985. Presently four waves are available (April-May 1985, August-October 1986,
LAugust-October 1988, and August-November 1990).
In the OSA panel a random sample of households in the Netherlands is fol-
lowed over time. Because the study concentrates on individuals who are between
15 and 61 years of age and who are not full-time students, only households with at
least one person in this categorv  are included. All individuals (and in all cases the
head of the household) in this‘categorv are interviewed. The first wave consists
of 4020 individuals (in 2132 households).
The data allow for a reconstruction of the sequence of labor  market states oc-
cupied bv the respondents and the sojourn times and income levels in these states.
Part of the information is retrospective. For example, the first wave (in 1985) con-
tains information on the labor  market histories from January 1, 1980 until the
date of the interview. The following labor  market positions are distinguished:
employment (job-to-job changes are recorded), self-employment, unemployment,
and not-in-labor-force (subdivided into military service, full-time education, and
other activities not related to the labor  market).
In this paper we restrict attention to respondents who were participating in
the panel as of the first wave. Individuals who were self-employed at certain dates
of the time span covered by the survey were deleted, since it is likelv that the
behavior of such individuals? at least in a certain period, deviates substantially
from the behavior as described by the model. For similar reasons, we do not use
information on respondents who.are  observed to be nonparticipant in the labor
market at certain dates. Finally, we delete observations for which the reported
wage is smaller than the legal minimum wage.3
As  a result. we ha,ve  a sample of li'67  individuals. Of these, 12% were unem-
ploved at the date of the first, interview.k. In our sample, 34% participate in all
four waves of the panel, while 33% onlv participate in the first wave. The income
changes at transit’ions  occurring before: the date of the first interview (April 1985)
are only recorded to lie in one of a fe\v  broad intervals. This makes the informa-
tion on spells ending before this date relatively inaccurate in comparison to spells
ending after it. For the latter spells we observe exact income levels. Therefore, the
first spell used is the spell which is in progress at the date of the first interview.
For computational reasons, information on subsequent spells is not used either.
The benefits level b  is taken to be t$he  average in the subsample. The manda-
torv  minimum wage wc L equals 1000 Dutch guilders (monthly) for respondents
vounger  than 23 vears of age. and 1450 Dutch guilders for older respondents. In”
“An  alternative way to deal with this problem is to assume that wages are measured with
clrror: see Van den Be&  and Ridder (1998).
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t,he  overall sample, wL is taken to be the average in the sample.
4 The likelihood function
If we only allow for heterogeneity in p,  t/hen  the parameters of the model are X,,  A,,
6 and the parameters of the distribution of p. We estimate these parameters from
observed labor  market histories of a sample of individuals. These labor  market
histories are recorded with the observation plan of Section 3. In this observation
plan a random sample from all individuals in a particular age bracket, who were
either employed or unemploved in May 1985, was drawn. The individuals in the
sample were followed until either their first transition from the state occupied
in May 1985 or the end of t.he  observation period, i.e. November 1990. Their
labor  market history from January 1, 1980 onward was also reconstructed. Hence
the individuals in the sample can be followed backward in time starting in May
1985. In the observation plan they are followed until either their first transition
from the state occupied in May 1985 or the end of the observation period, i.e.
January 1, 1980. For the younger age groups we observe many transitions from
(un)emplovment to full-time education or, for the men, militarv service. Theu
corresponding unemplovment or job spells are treated as censored spells.
In its simplest form. the model has no observed explanatory variables, and
the dependent variables’ are aspects of the individual labor  market histories. To
be specific, the dependent variables include the labor  market position (employed
or unemploved) at the date of the first interview and the elapsed and residual
duration in that position. If an unemploved individual finds a job before the”
end of the observation period. we observe the re-employment wage wO.  Further?
we observe the wages of employed individuals at the time of the first interview,
‘a:1  : and, if the job spell of this individual ends before the observation period,
the tvpe of transition at the end of this spell. This is either a transition into
unemplovment?  or into another job.
The derivation of the joint distribution of the observed variables is in two
st’eps.  First, we derive the joint distribution conditional on a particular value of
1).  Next, we integrate with respect to p to obtain the joint distribution of the
observable variables. Below, we merely list the distributions of some of the main
ingredients of the likelihood function. See Koning,  Ridder and Van den Berg
(1995) for more details.
For a given value of p > max(b,  u:~ ),  the emplovment and job durations are- J c
txponentiallv distributed. Following Ridder (1984))  this implies that the corre-
sponding elapsed and residual durations are independent and also exponentiallvr/
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distributed. If p < b,  there is no gain from trade, and if p < wL,  the mini-
mum wage is too high to employ the workers. In both cases the workers are
permanently unemployed. If p > max(b,  wL),  then an individual is frictionally
unemployed with probability a/@  + A,).  In our data we have wL > b. Hence the
structural unemployment rate us  qe uals H(w,J.  The unconditional probability
that an individual is unemployed at the time of the first interview equals
(12)
In the sequel, we assume that the censoring times for the elapsed and resid-
ual unemployment durations are stochastically independent of the corresponding
durations, i. e. we assume that censoring is independent. For the unemployed the
joint conditional distribution of the elapsed and residual unemployment durations
is degenerate if p < wL. In that case the elapsed and residual unemployment du-
rations are both infinite, hence the observed durations are censored. Because the
observation period is at most 129 months, we never observe the elapsed and resid-
ual unemployment durations to be infinite, but if they are both censored we allow
for this possibilitv. Given the length of the observation period, we consider this to
be a reasonable assumption. If p > w- L, the elapsed and residual unemployment
durations at the time of the first interview are independently and exponentially
distributed with parameter A,. Note that these durations can be censored as well.
The conditional distribution of the accepted wage from unemployment w. is
onlv defined if p > wL.c - We denote this conditional p.d.f. by f(w,lp), with f as in
(7). Note that w(p) and BT(P) are as in equations (5) and (8).
If the individual is emploved at the date of the first interviewb , the conditional
distributions are onlv defined if p > wL.- The densitv function of wages of em-
ploved individuals at the time of the first interview conditional on p is denoted
h I&q IP)  7c with g as in (9): again with w(p) and a(p) as in (5) and (8).
Further, the elapsed and residual job duration at the time of the first interview
are independently exponentially distributed with parameter 6  + X,F(w,  Ip).  Note
that this hazard rate out of the job is conditional on p. A subsequent transition
to a higher paving job has probability” c
and the complement of this is the probability of a transition into unemployment.
The individual likelihood contribution is the joint distribution of the observ-
Aes,  which is obtained bv integrat!ion  with respect to the distribution of p. The”

























